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Research into Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions from Irish agriculture has focused on 
two  main  themes  (i)  projecting  future  emission  levels  and  (ii)  devising  abatement 
strategies at the farm level such as changes in animal diet, better waste management 
and or changes in farm management practices. These abatement strategies will have 
costs associated with them some of which, such as capital investment or reducing 
livestock numbers, may be substantial. However economic theory indicates that market 
based solutions such as tradable emissions permits (TEP’s) are the least cost means of 
achieving desired reductions in emissions. 
 
To date within Europe a regulatory approach has been favoured when trying to curtail 
emissions from agriculture, the Nitrates Directive being a recent example. This paper 
seeks to compare the impact on farm incomes of a regulatory approach to emissions 
abatement with a TEP’s approach. In order to do this data from the Irish National Farm 
Survey is used to construct a farm-level Linear Programming (LP) model for each 
farmer within the dataset. Firstly a baseline scenario with no constraint on emissions is 
run.  We then enforce a 20 percent reduction in emissions and the impact on farm 
incomes is measured. The LP model is then used to determine each farmers shadow 
value for a TEP. These shadow values are then weighted up to estimate the supply and 
demand and used to simulate a market for TEP’s and the farm income is re-estimated. 
Finally the implications for farm incomes of both abatement strategies are compared 
with the baseline scenario. Keywords: Farm level modelling, greenhouse gas emissions, tradable emissions 
permits 
JEL codes: Q12, Q52 
 
Copyright 2000 by James P Breen. All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial 






The  increasing  concern  over  climate  change  has  led  to  a  number  of  international 
agreements to control greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, including the Kyoto Protocol 
and the Clean Air for Europe (CAFE) Act. More recently the EU have proposed to cut 
greenhouse gas emissions by 20 percent by 2020 and have offered to reduce emissions 
further if other developed regions will also commit to reducing their greenhouse gas 
emissions. Ireland occupies a somewhat unique position amongst western economies 
in that agriculture accounts for a very large proportion of its total greenhouse gas 
emissions.  Agriculture  currently  accounts  for  over  25  percent  of  greenhouse  gas 
emissions  in  the  form  of  methane  and  nitrous  oxide  emissions.  In  comparison 
agriculture accounts for a far smaller proportion of total greenhouse gas emissions the 
EU  approximately  10%  of  greenhouse  gas  emissions  from  the  EU  come  from 
agriculture  (Eurostat  2005).  Australia  and  New  Zealand  are  amongst  the  only 
developed  countries  with  a  proportion  of  total  greenhouse  gas  emissions  from 
agriculture that is comparable with Ireland. Agriculture, forestry and fishing accounted 
for approximately 23 percent of greenhouse gas emissions in Australia in 2005 and 
approximately 32 percent of total greenhouse gas emissions in New Zealand.  
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national GHG emissions. As a result targeted reductions in GHG emissions have been 
set  in  the  past  for  the  Irish  agricultural  sector,  for  example  the  National  Climate 
Change  Strategy  called  for  a  reduction  in  methane  emissions  from  agriculture, 
equivalent to a 10 percent reduction in the livestock herd. If we are to assume that as 
part of the EU’s proposal to cut emissions by 20 percent by 2020, each EU member 
state will have to cut its national emissions by 20 percent then it will be necessary for 
Irish agriculture to make significant reductions to its emissions levels given its current 
contribution  to  Ireland’s  total  greenhouse  gas  emissions.  Furthermore  given  its 
declining importance and its high level of greenhouse gas emissions relative to other 
sectors Irish agriculture could potentially be faced with a reduction in net emissions 
beyond the 20 percent target set by the EU. However current high prices and future 
agricultural policy reforms will potentially lead to an increase rather than a decrease in 
GHG emissions from Irish agriculture. For example the expansion of the EU milk 
quota is likely to lead to an increase in Irish dairy cow numbers and consequently an 
increase in GHG emissions. While high cereal prices along with the decision to allow 
farmers to take land out of set-aside is likely to lead to an increase in the area tilled 
within Ireland and the release of carbon dioxide currently stored within the ground. 
 
Agricultural production in Ireland largely takes the form of pasture based livestock 
production with approximately 90 percent of the total agricultural area used in the 
production  of  milk,  beef  and  sheep  from  grass.  Methane  released  through  enteric 
fermentation and manure management in the dairy and beef sectors account for over 50 
percent  of  total  greenhouse  gas  emissions  from  Irish  agriculture  (Donnellan  and 
Hanrahan 2003). Therefore if Irish agriculture is to achieve meaningful reductions in 
its net greenhouse  gas  emissions, then significant changes in one or  both of these 
sectors is required. However the prospect of milk quota abolition by 2015 presents a 
further complication as many of Irelands dairy farmers are looking to expand their 
herds significantly once quotas are abolished.  
 
To date there has been a considerable volume of research into the impact on emissions 
from changing farm practices in Ireland. O’Mara et al. (2007) conducted a review of 
strategies to reduce enteric methane emissions.  Lovett et al. (2006) have looked at a 
range of alternative greenhouse gas abatement strategies that would reduce emissions per litre of milk. While Lovett et al. (2005) and O’Mara (2006) explored the impact of 
changes  in  animal  type  and  feeding  practices  on  agricultural  emissions.  These 
alternative  abatement  strategies  have  been  shown  to  help  in  the  reduction  of 
greenhouse gas emissions. However in many cases the cost of achieving that reduction 
is quite high relative to the reduction in emissions achieved. Therefore it is likely that 
while these abatement strategies will help to reduce emissions they would be unlikely 
to achieve a reduction of 20 percent in emissions from Irish agriculture. Secondly if 
these emissions abatement strategies were to be used it is possible that the inventory 
process  currently  being  used  may  not  capture  fully  their  effect  on  greenhouse  gas 
emissions.  
 
Alternatively policy can be used to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the simplest way 
being a command and control approach that would place a flat reduction of 20 percent 
on each farmers total greenhouse gas production levels. While such a system is simple 
it would also be quite rigid and more importantly it would be very inefficient as it does 
not  consider  the  marginal  abatement  costs  of  individual  farmers.  Economists  have 
proposed a number of alternative cost-minimizing emissions abatement strategies. One 
such  approach  is  tradable  emissions  permits  or  permit  trading,  the  idea  was  first 
conceived by Crocker (1966) and Dales (1968) and the concept was further refined by 
Baumol and Oates (1971 and 1988). Baumol and Oates (1988) argued that permit 
trading may be the most cost efficient means of cutting emissions. While De Cara et al. 
(2005) concluded that there was a wide variability across Europe in abatement costs of 
greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture. They concluded that there was potentially 
significant cost savings from market based mechanisms.  
 
In  this  analysis  the  marginal  abatement  cost  of  emissions  reduction  is  the  income 
foregone  from  reducing  your  agricultural  activity  i.e.  reducing  livestock  numbers. 
Considerable  variability  exists  in  the  gross  margins  per  livestock  unit  earned  in 
alternative agricultural enterprises. A significant difference also exists in the marginal 
abatement cost of an intensive dairy farmer who must reduce his dairy cow numbers in 
order to reduce his greenhouse gas emissions and the marginal abatement cost of a 
beef farmer who for example must reduce his number of steer animals or suckler cows. 
Therefore  if  we  were  to  create  a  market  and  allow  the  dairy  farmer  to  purchase emissions permits from the beef farmer the cost of achieving the emissions reduction 
could be minimised.  
 
This  paper  compares  the  cost  of  achieving  a  targeted  reduction  in  emissions  by 
allowing farmers to trade permits with a command and control approach or emission 
standards approach.   
 
2. Background 
The  impact  on  farm  incomes  of  two  strategies,  emissions  standards  and  tradable 
emissions permits, both of which could be applied to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
from Irish agriculture is analysed. An emissions standard or command and control 
approach would require a regulatory body to set an acceptable environmental standard 
for polluters and to monitor their levels of emissions and if necessary to enforce the 
standard.  Such  a  strategy  is  relatively  simplistic  and  if  successfully  enforced  will 
guarantee that total emissions do not exceed the acceptable level. However emission 
standards can be highly inefficient as marginal abatement costs will typically vary by 
emitter and may enforce inefficient levels of abatement on some polluters.  
 
Figure 1 below outlines how an emission standard would work, in this example we 
have two sources x and y. A uniform emission standard is applied and both sources are 
required to reduce their emission levels to point A. Source x has a higher marginal cost 
of emissions abatement (MCAx) than source y (MCAy). Therefore the cost to x of 
reducing emissions by A is the area under the line MCAx up to A and the cost to y of 
reducing emissions by A is the area under the line MCAy up to A. As can be seen from 
Figure 1 the cost of reducing emissions to the level A will be greater for source x than 
for source y.  
Figure 1: Emission Standards 
Source: Prato (1998) 
 
Figure 2 below outlines how a market for tradable emission permits would operate. In 
this example both sources have been issued with 0.5A tradable emission permits. As in 
figure 1, source x has a higher marginal cost of abatement than y. Therefore so long as 
x’s abatement cost is greater than the cost of an emissions permit, x has an incentive to 
purchase, while y has an incentive to sell permits so long as the permit price is greater 
than their marginal abatement cost. Therefore source x will buy permits and increase 
its emissions from A – 0.5A to A – 0.25A, while source Y sells permits and will 
reduce its emissions from A – 0.5A to A – 0.75A. As a result the marginal cost of 
reducing emissions is equalized across the sources of emissions and the overall cost of 
reducing emissions is minimized (Prato 1998). 
 
Figure 1: Market for Tradable Emission Permits 
Source: Prato (1998) 
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Much of the research to date on tradable emission permits has been largely theoretical. 
While the majority of the applied literature has focused on trading permits for the 
following airborne emissions SO2, CO2 and waterborne nitrates emissions. De Cara et 
al. (2005) used a combination of mixed integer and linear programming to model the 
emissions of methane and nitrous oxide from regionally representative EU farms. They 
then examined the magnitude of emissions abatement costs. They concluded that there 
was  a  significant  variability  in  abatement  costs  and  that  there  was  potential  for 
emissions trading to reduce the cost of emissions abatement. Carlier et al. (2005) used 
simulation models of the Flemish pig finishing sector to compare the performance of a 
system  of  tradable  permits  with  a  command  and  control  approach  to  achieve 
compliance with the EU Nitrates Directive. They found that the costs of satisfying the 
Nitrates Directive were 88 percent lower under the tradable permit system than under 
the most efficient command and control approach. Both analyses suggest that allowing 
farmers to trade emissions permits could provide the opportunity to reduce the cost of 
emissions  abatement.  Brannlund  et  al.  (1998)  examined  the  impact  that  allowing 
producer within the Swedish pulp and paper industry to trade permits and found that 
profits in the industry would have been 6 percent higher in 1989 and 1 percent higher 
in 1990 under a tradable permit system.  
 
The EU’s current preference is for command and control environmental policy as it 
relates  to  agriculture.  Dietz  and  Heijnes  (1995)  argued  that  these  policies  in  EU 
member states are neither effective nor efficient. This raises the question of whether or 
not market based policies would be more effective and efficient in reducing emissions. 
Advocates of emissions trading argue that it presents a least cost means of emissions 
abatement. Applied work such as Carlier et al. (2005) and De Cara et al. (2005) would 
appear to support this argument.  
 
3. Data and Methods 
The European Unions  Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme (GGETS) began 
operating  in  January  2005;  however  this  scheme  does  not  allow  farmers  to  trade 
emissions permits and to date no such tradable permits scheme has been introduced for 
Irish  farmers.  Therefore  this  analysis  assumes  that  Irish  farmers  are  restricted  to 
trading permits of CO2 equivalents with other Irish farmers and one emission permit is the equivalent of one tonne of CO2. In the absence of any historical data on the value 
and volume of permits traded a normative modelling process was necessary. For this 
reason a linear programming approach was used and as noted by Jones (1982), such 
approaches are quite useful in modeling behaviour under conditions which are outside 
the range of past experience and which therefore cannot be modeled by more positive 
techniques such as econometric models.  
 
A farm level linear programming model similar to those in Breen et al. (2005) will be 
constructed based on data from the Teagasc National Farm Survey (Connolly et al. 
2007). The model will simulate the future behaviour of Irish farmers under a baseline 
scenario of no reduction in greenhouse gas emissions along with two scenarios where 
greenhouse gas emissions are constrained. In the first of these two scenarios farmers 
will have to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 20 percent and in the second 
scenario  farmers  will  again  have  to  reduce  their  greenhouse  gas  emissions  by  20 
percent  however  they  will  be  allowed  to  trade  emissions  permits.  We  can  then 
determine the impact of permit trading on future farm profit. The results of these two 
scenarios will then be compared with a baseline scenario where there is no restriction 
on greenhouse gas emissions. Models of this type have been used recently to analyze 
the impact of a number of agricultural policy scenarios on Irish farmers. Breen et al. 
(2005),  Breen  and  Hennessy  (2003)  and  Thorne  (2004)  used  farm  level  modes  to 
assess the impact of the 2003 CAP reforms on Irish farmers. Hennessy and Thorne 
(2006) and Hennessy et al. (2005) used similar approaches to look at the impact of 
WTO  reforms  and  the  EU  Nitrates  Directive  respectively  on  the  income  of  Irish 
farmers. 
 
The NFS is a member of FADN, the Farm Accountancy Data Network of Europe. It 
surveys approximately 1,200 farms nationally that are weighted to represent the total 
population of over 100,000 farms. A linear programming model is constructed for each 
individual farmer within the sample. Linear programming is an optimization tool in 
which  we  maximize  or  minimize  an  objective  function  subject  to  a  given  set  of 
constraints. In this study it is assumed farmers are profit maximizers and will seek to 
maximize their gross margin each year for a nine year period. Figure 3 outlines how 
such a modeling system may operate. The model will include all of the main livestock 
and crop enterprises in Ireland. Farmers will be subject to a number of constraints including land, labour, capital, land type, milk quota, policy related constraints and 
environmental constraints. The input-output co-efficients used are those recorded in 
the base year and are assumed to remain fixed through time despite policy changes; in 
other words for any given production process only one combination of the factors of 
production  is  assumed.  The  model  therefore  will  solve  for  the  optimal  mix  of 
enterprises subject to the specified constraints. The model projects the gross margin for 
each farm as well as the level of emissions per farm and thus allowing the impact of 
emissions trading on these criteria to be assessed.  
 
The model also uses aggregate projections from the FAPRI-Ireland model (Binfield et 
al 2007) this allows us to simulate farmer behaviour across a nine year time period and 
to model the impact of policy changes on emissions in the context of permit trading 
and no permit trading. The FAPRI-Ireland model is comprised of a set of individual 
econometrically  estimated  commodity  models  that  are  linked  and  solved 
simultaneously. 
 
The farm-level linear programming model is represented by the central box in figure 3. 
The farmer’s production decisions will be constrained by the existing supply of land, 
labour, and capital. Farmers’ decisions will also be constrained by agricultural and 
environmental policy from the EU and Ireland and these are represented by the upper 
right and upper central box of figure 3. A number of likely farm activities are specified 
for each farmer based on their existing activities and other possible activities. However 
non dairy farmers will not be allowed to enter milk production, as they currently do not 
possess milk quota. The net revenue of each of these activities will be estimated and 
projected prices from the FAPRI-Ireland aggregate level model as represented by the 
box in the top left hand corner of figure one will be used in calculating the gross 
margin per enterprise across a nine year planning horizon. This will allow the linear 
programming model to be run each year for a nine year period and so changes in farm 
size, profit and farm numbers due to permit trading can be determined. The marginal 
revenue of carrying an additional livestock unit or growing an additional crop acre will 
be estimated and the optimal farm system for each farmer will be determined.  
  
Figure. 3: Conceptual Framework for Model Irish Farm-Level Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions and Tradable Emissions Permit 
Total emissions per farm will be calculated for each farm by multiplying livestock 
units by the equivalent emissions coefficients. Methane coefficients will be taken from 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (1996) and the Department of 
the Environment (1997) as was done in Donnellan and Hanrahan (2003). There are 
five main types of greenhouse gas emissions from Irish agriculture and these include 
methane  from  enteric  fermentation  and  manure  management,  nitrous  oxide  from 
manure management, nitrous oxide from agricultural soils and nitrous oxide from the 
use  of  chemical  fertilizers.  This  analysis  currently  contains  all  of  these  emission 
sources with the exception of nitrous oxide from fertilizer. The incorporation of nitrous 
oxide from fertilizer will require the estimation of an econometric model to measure 
the relationship between fertilizer use, stocking rate and animal type and this will be 
the  next  stage  in  the  analysis.  However  it  should  be  noted  that  CO2  from  the 
FAPRI-Ireland  
Aggregate level Model 
·  Price Projections 
·  Qty Projections 
EU and Irish 
Agricultural Policy 
·  Decoupling of 
Direct Payments 
·  Milk Quota 
Abolition 
Farm-Level Model 
·  Linear Programming Optimization Model 
·  National Farm Survey Data 
·  Estimate Marginal Revenue 
·  Maximizing Net Revenue 
·  Constraints Land, Labour, Capital and Policy Constraints  
·  Alternative Farm Activities 
EU and Irish 
Environmental Policy 
·  Nitrates 
·  Ammonia 
·  Methane 
Baseline Scenario 
Unconstrained Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions 
Alternative Scenarios 
Permit Trading allowed 
Supply & Demand of Permits 
generated 
Permits Traded & Permit Price 
determined breakdown of fertilizer accounts for less than 3 percent of total emissions from Irish 
agriculture.   
 
Initially a baseline scenario where greenhouse gas emissions are unconstrained will be 
run as is shown by the box in the lower left corner of figure 3. The results of the permit 
trading scenario studied will then be compared against this baseline scenario. Once the 
gross margins and the optimum enterprise mix for each farmer has been estimated we 
can then determine the shadow value of an emissions permit. These shadow values will 
then  be  used  to  estimate  the  supply  and  demand  curve  for  permits  amongst  Irish 
farmers and a market for emissions permits will be simulated. From this the quantity of 
permits  traded  and  the  equilibrium  price  for  a  permit  will  be  determined,  this  is 
represented by the box in the bottom right of figure 3. Shrestha et al. (2006) used a 
similar approach to simulate a market of Irish milk quota. As shown in figure 3 the 
quantity of permits bought or sold by each farmer in year one will feed back into the 
farm level linear programming model and the farmers environmental constraint will 
then be adjusted by the number of permits they traded. The linear programming model 
will then be resolved and a new optimum farm mix based on maximizing gross margin 
subject to the new environmental constraints specified above. This process will be 
repeated  for  the  remaining  years.  The  impact  of  an  emissions  reduction  on  farm 
income can be compared with a baseline scenario where there is no enforced reduction 
in greenhouse gas emissions and the potential of permit trading to offset some of this 
loss in income can then be assessed. 
Results 
The  model  allows  us  to  compare  farmer  gross  margin  under  alternative  policy 
scenarios.  The  results  of  three  scenarios  are  presented  the  scenarios  are  called 
Unconstrained, 20% Reduction and TEP’s. Firstly the “Unconstrained” scenario is run 
utilizing FAPRI-Ireland baseline projections in this scenario there is no constraint on 
individual farmers’ greenhouse gas emissions. The “20% Reduction” scenario requires 
farmers to reduce their emissions by at least 20 percent of their historical level. In the 
“TEP’s”  scenario  farmers  are  issued  with  a  number  of  tradable  emissions  permits 
equivalent to 80 percent of their historical production which they are allowed to trade 
with other farmers. It is assumed that farmers emission levels are constrained under the 
20%  Reduction  and  TEP’s  scenarios  from  2009  onwards.  The  impact  of  all  three 
scenarios on average farmer gross margin is presented.   
Figure 4 below illustrates the supply and demand curves for tradable emission permits 
in 2011. A supply and demand curve for tradable emissions permits was estimated 
from the farm-level LP model and a market for emissions permits was simulated for 
each year between 2009 and 2016. As can be seen from Figure 4 below the market 
clearing price in 2011 was €59.52 per permit and approximately 2.6 million permits 








































Figure. 4: Simulated Market for Tradable Greenhouse Gas Emissions Permits 
Source: Authors Own Calculations  
 
Figure 5 illustrates the market clearing price per year for permits over the period 2009 
to  2016.  The  market  clearing  price  for  permits  is  at  its  highest  in  2009  at 
approximately €67 per permit and declines gradually to approximately €55 per permit 
by  2016.  The  projected  market  clearing  price  under  the  simulated  market  is 
significantly higher than the market clearing price in the European Unions Greenhouse 
Gas Emission Trading Scheme (GGETS) in 2007, where the prices for permits did not 
exceed €20. The reason for this higher price in the simulated market is largely due to 
the fact that the restrictions being enforced are far more binding than those in the 
GGETS,  secondly  this  analysis  does  not  currently  consider  the  potential  of  other 
abatement  strategies  such  as  improving  the  milk  production  per  dairy  cow.  This 
reduction in the market clearing permit price over time is largely a result of the decline 
in gross margins to the dairy sector as a result of decreasing milk prices and increasing 
variable costs of production. This reduction in dairy gross margins causes the demand 


















Figure.  5:  Market  Clearing  Price  for  Tradable  Greenhouse  Gas  Emissions 
Permits 2009-2016 
Source: Authors Own Calculations 
 
Figure 6 compares the impact of the three scenarios on dairy farm gross margin. As 
can be seen average gross margin per dairy farm under the unconstrained scenario 
declines from approximately €57,000 in 2008 to approximately €45,000 by 2016. This 
decline in dairy farm gross margin is largely a result of the decline in dairy prices that 
was  projected  under  the  FAPRI-Ireland  baseline  scenario.  If  farmers  are  forced  to 
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to 80 percent of the historical level then average 
gross margin on dairy farms will be approximately €9,000 below their level in the 
unconstrained scenario a reduction of 20 percent. The loss in average gross margin per 
farm is highest on dairy farms; this is to be expected given the high levels of methane 
produced by dairy cows and the high gross margin per cow. In comparison if farmers 
are allowed to trade permits the average gross margin on dairy farms is approximately 
2 percent lower than under the unconstrained scenario or a reduction of approximately 





















Figure.  6:  Impact  on  Average  Dairy  Farm  Gross  Margin  of  Alternative 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Scenarios Source: Authors Own Calculations 
 
Figure 7 projects the change in average gross margins on beef farms. The average 
gross  margin  on  beef  farms  in  2008  is  approximately  €11,000  per  farm  and  this 
average  gross  margin  is  projected  to  change  very  little  under  the  unconstrained 
scenario.  This is a result of a moderate increase in beef prices under the baseline 
scenario  and  increasing  direct  costs  of  production.  When  we  compare  the  20% 
reduction scenario we see that average  gross margin is projected to decline by 44 
percent to approximately €6,000. While the actual reduction in gross margin is lower 
than on dairy farms it is the largest percentage change in projected gross margin by 
farm  type.  Beef  farms  in  Ireland  are  typically  mixed  farms  while  the  principal 
enterprise is beef production they are also likely to have some sheep and/or tillage. As 
a result on the majority of beef farms their historical greenhouse gas emissions level is 
lower than if they had only kept beef animals. Therefore when the 20 percent reduction 
in greenhouse gas emissions is enforced these mixed beef farms find themselves to be 
more constrained than they would have been if they had only stocked beef animals in 
the historical reference period. This is the main reason for the large decrease in the 
average  farm  gross  margin.  When  farmers  are  allowed  to  trade  permits  we  see  a 
significant increase in average gross margins on beef farms, the average gross margin 
in the permit trading scenario is approximately 84 percent of the average gross margin 
under the unconstrained scenario compared with 56 percent under the 20% reduction 
scenario. However it should be noted that over 50 percent of beef farmers become 
suppliers of permits to the market and this accounts for some of the increase in average 



















Figure. 7: Impact of Average Beef Farm Gross Margin of Alternative Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions Scenarios 
Source: Authors Own Calculations  
The story for sheep farms is to some extent the converse of what is projected to happen 
on  beef  farms.  As  with  beef  farms,  the  average  gross  margin  on  sheep  farms  is 
projected to change very little under the baseline unconstrained scenario. However in 
contrast to the beef sector the impact of the 20% reduction scenario on sheep farms is 
quite small. The reason being that many specialist sheep farms historically would have 
kept beef animals also and therefore when the reduction in emissions is enforced it is 
not binding on many of these farms. As a result average gross margin declines by only 
6 percent compared with the unconstrained scenario, furthermore when farmers are 
allowed to trade emissions permits average gross margin on sheep farms would be 




















Figure.  8:  Impact  on  Average  Sheep  Farm  Gross  Margin  of  Alternative 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Scenarios 
Source: Authors Own Calculations  
 
The average gross margin per farm for cereal farms under the Unconstrained scenario 
is projected to decline from approximately €38,400 in 2008 down to €37,600 in 2016. 
Under  the  20%  Reduction  scenario  the  average  gross  margin  on  cereal  farms  is 
projected to decline by about 10 percent. Many cereal farms would also have built up a 
substantial base emissions level by stocking beef animals and as a result the required 
reduction in emissions level from 2009 onwards is not binding for many of the cereal 
producers. Hence the impact that the necessary reduction in greenhouse gas emissions 
is  projected  to  have  on  their  average  gross  margin  is  moderate  under  the  20% 
Reduction  scenario.  Once  again  if  farmers  are  allowed  to  trade  permits  we  see  a 
significant increase in the average gross margin. The average gross margin on cereal farms  under  the  TEP’s  scenario  is  99  percent  of  the  level  earned  under  the 











Figure.  9:  Impact  on  Average  Cereal  Farm  Gross  Margin  of  Alternative 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Scenarios 
Source: Authors Own Calculations 
 
Under the Unconstrained scenario there were almost 5,000 farmers with a negative 
gross margin. These farmers who are operating a market loss would find their Single 
Farm  Payment  being  eroded  by  their  loss  making  enterprise  and  so  their  optimal 
solution is to cease production while retaining their land in order to draw down their 
Single Farm Payment. However by doing this the only incomes to these farms are 
payments and subsidies such as the Single Farm Payment. Therefore under both the 
Unconstrained and 20% Reduction scenarios the average market based gross margin 
earned  on  these  farms  would  be  zero  if  they  cease  production.  However  if  these 
farmers are allowed to trade the permits that they would have based on their historical 
production then they would provide an additional source of income. Figure 10 below 
projects the increase in income earned by these non-productive farmers from 2009 to 
2016.  In  2009  the  average  income  earned  is  almost  €5,700  compared with  almost 
€6,800 by 2016. The income earned has increased over time despite a decrease in the 
market equilibrium price for permits. The reason for this change in income earned is 
due  to  changes  in  the  number  of  those  farmers  who  are  earning  a  negative  gross 









Figure.  10:  Increase  in  Income  of  Non-Productive  Farms  from  Tradable 
Emissions Permits 
Source: Authors Own Calculations 
 
Conclusions 
The  analysis  presented  above  outlines  the  potential  impact  of  a  restriction  in 
greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture. If a 20 percent reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions relative to their historical base emissions was enforced at the farm level, the 
dairy sector would face the greatest reduction in average gross margin. This is to be 
expected given that firstly dairy cows are amongst the largest producers of greenhouse 
gas emissions and secondly the gross margin per livestock unit is higher on dairy farms 
than on other farms. The average gross margin on beef farms is projected to decline by 
€5,000  or  44  percent  as  a  result  of  the  20  percent  reduction  in  greenhouse  gas 
emissions.  This  would  appear  to  be  a  disproportionately  large  effect  given  the 
reduction  in  emissions  that  is  enforced.  However  this  reduction  in  gross  margin 
reflects the fact that historically beef farmers in Ireland devoted some of their land to 
the production of sheep and/or cereals both of which have relatively lower emissions 
coefficients than beef production. As a result many of Irelands beef farmers will have a 
historical level of emissions that is much lower than the level they would have if they 
had only stocked beef animals. In comparison the projected percentage decrease in 
average gross margin on sheep and cereal farms is much smaller at approximately 6 
and 10 percent below the unconstrained gross margin respectively. The reason for this 
relatively small impact is that many of these farmers will have kept beef animals in the 
reference year and as a result they have acquired more emissions permits than they 
would have if they devoted their land entirely to the production of sheep or cereals. As 
a result an enforced emissions reduction of 20 percent would have little impact on many of those farmers whose optimal solution is to specialise in the production of 
sheep or cereals. 
 
The results suggest that permit trading can lower the cost of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions from Irish agriculture. For all four farm types the average gross margin is 
higher when the agriculture sector is allowed to achieve its greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions by allowing farmers to trade permits. The most significant gains are seen on 
dairy and beef farms where the percentage decrease in average gross margins is much 
smaller  when  they  are  allowed  to  trade  permits.  If  farmers  are  allowed  to  trade 
emissions permits then the average gross margin on dairy farms falls by approximately 
2 percent in the permit trading scenario compared with a 20 percent reduction in the 
average gross margin when no permit trading is allowed. The percentage decrease in 
average gross margins for beef farms would be 16 percent if they are allowed to trade 
permits compared with 44 percent if they are not allowed to trade permits. The change 
in average gross margins on sheep and cereal farms is negligible as a result of allowing 
farmers to achieve their emissions reductions by  trading permits. Finally the other 
significant gain from allowing farmers to trade permits is made by those farms with a 
negative  market  gross  margin  the  income  on  these  farms  would  be  almost  €7,000 
higher in 2016 if they were allowed to supply permits to a greenhouse gas emissions 
market.   
 
As  stated  the  next  stage  in  this  analysis  is  to  incorporate  the  production  of  CO2 
emissions  from  the  breakdown  of  chemical  fertilizer.  In  order  to  do  this  an 
econometric  model  will  be  used  to  estimate  the  relationship  between  fertilizer 
application and stocking density and animal type. This will allow the model to adjust 
individual farmer’s fertilizer use as the farmer changes his stocking rate and the type of 
animals kept on the farm. This model will be estimated using a pooled dataset from the 
NFS collected over the years 2002 to 2006. Once this is completed the impact of 
alternative abatement strategies such as improving the genetic merit of the animal, 
changing animal diet and minimum tilling will be included in the analysis and the 
permit market will be re-simulated.  
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